Introducing the law games: predicting legal liability and fault in satellite operations by Newman, Christopher et al.
Northumbria Research Link
Citation:  Newman,  Christopher,  Dinsley,  Ralph  and  Ralston,  William  (2021)  Introducing  the  law 
games: predicting legal liability and fault in satellite operations. Advances in Space Research, 67 (11).  
pp. 3785-3792. ISSN 0273-1177 
Published by: Elsevier
URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asr.2020.04.020 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asr.2020.04.020>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/43130/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
This  document  may differ  from the  final,  published version of  the research  and has been made 
available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version 
of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.)



































































  1 
INTRODUCING THE LAW GAMES: PREDICTING LEGAL LIABILITY 
AND FAULT IN SATELLITE OPERATIONS 
 
 
Christopher Newman, Ralph Dinsley, William Ralstonr 
 
 
Over recent times there has been a rise in the number of objects placed into Earth orbit. 
With various countries licensing a number of large constellations, the orbital population is 
set to increase dramatically. A significant number of technical advances have facilitated 
this and, in the UK and elsewhere, this has been matched by the updating of legislation and 
an increased policy focus on the need for increased space surveillance and tracking. The 
rise of large constellations coupled with an increasing number of experimental techniques 
such as active debris removal or on-orbit servicing procedures means that establishing fault 
will be crucial if litigation is to be successful. In doing this, any legal proceedings will look 
at both norms of behaviour, deviation from which will point towards fault and the types 
and standard of evidence that will be required. 
 
This paper will outline these problems in detail. It will be proposed that what is required to 
map out the contours of liability are both codification of the norms for satellite operations 
and clarity on protocols for evidence gathering in cases where fault may be contested in 
orbital operations. This discussion will identify that a way in which this could be achieved 
i  b  he e of ace la  game . The e a e im la ion , imila  o mili a  ar games, in 
which fictional scenarios could highlight some of the key legal issues that might need to be 
dealt with. The paper will outline some of the ways in which the law games might work 






It is now widely accepted that, as human activity in space increases, there is an increasing need to clean up the 
orbit of the Earth by not only mitigating the creation of new debris, but through active debris removal (ADR) and 
proactively removing debris from heavily populated orbits (Welly, 2010). It has been known for some time 
(Williamson, 2006) that without taking action to remove the detritus of human space activity, there will be a 
significant increase in the likelihood of collisions between space objects and a resulting reduction of access to the 
orbital space domain (Degrange, 2018). In addition, given developments in satellite servicing technology, there 
appears to be a growing interest amongst satellite operators in technologies that can prolong the life of expensive 
satellites by employing the services of active satellites to engage in on-orbit servicing (Graham and Kingston, 
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  2 
2015). Yet as the technologies and techniques come within the grasp of the spacefaring community, it is necessary 
to recognise that these rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) are still in the experimental stage1. Any such 
untried space operation therefore involves the significant risk of a malfunction causing damage, either to the 
o e a o  o n acec af , o  o a acec af  o ned and o e a ed b  ano he  (Blo n  2019). Under international 
space law, liability for any damage caused in space by one space object on another is assigned to the launching 
state on a fault basis2. Usually, in international law, fault can be established through lack of compliance with 
treaty obligation, breach of a duty of care or failure to comply with established norms of behaviour (Lyall and 
Larsen, 2018). In satellite operations there are no normative rules to point to in respect of assigning fault for 
collisions in space (Blount, 2019). For all RPO missions, the lack of accepted operator practice means that in 
many circumstances it could be extremely difficult to establish fault. The experimental nature of RPO missions 
will make it extremely high risk and consequently difficult to establish clear identifiable operational duties which 
have been breached. The corollary of this is that space activities have entered into a legal vacuum, where 
operators may be engaging in activities that lay them open to potentially ruinous litigation.  
 
This discussion will look at the legal oblem  facing o e a o  in e ec  of e abli hing fa l  in on-orbit RPO 
missions. The paper will start by examining the governance of space activity and its practical operation on three 
distinct levels. First, the overarching international treaties which impose specific duties on states to both limit 
unfettered exploitation of the space environment and also to encourage peaceful uses of outer space. It should be 
noted that while this discussion will mention a variety of actors in the space environment (operators, companies 
etc.) it is ultimately nation states that bear the liability for damage.  
 
Flowing from this, states discharge their responsibilities under these international treaties by enacting domestic 
laws which regulate space activity within the context of national boundaries. The paper will identify that the 
assignment of states to bear liability for damage caused by space activity is not accompanied by any indication of 
the factors which might point to fault in orbital operations. The paper will then look at an increasingly important 
aspect of the space governance framework in the form of of  la  in men  ch a  g ideline , hich hel  o 
establish best practice amongst space operators and can lead to the establishment of normative patterns of 
behaviour. In the absence of any binding or persuasive guidance, the paper will address the question as to how 
courts might construct the contours of fault using the common law tort of negligence.  
 
These legal elements will lay the conceptual edifice for the final part of the paper in which it will be shown that 
the legal and soft-law instruments lack sufficient detail to guide state regulators, satellite owners and operators. 
The paper will, therefore, conclude by arguing for a role-playing style simulation of an incident to try and provide 
some indication of how a collision event would unfold. This will lay the foundations for what will be known 
colloquially as the Space Law Games (SLG). It will be argued that there is insufficient clarity as to what the 
contours of fault will be in litigation and whether an operator has breached a duty of care owed to other space 
users. Throughout the paper, a series of key questions will arise in trying to establish the legal elements of RPO 
missions and one theme will become apparent: the need for some sort of legal precedent as to both the type of 
issues that will attract liability and the type of information that will be available to the courts in order to determine 
fault. The paper will draw on a unique pair of simulation methodologies: the military approach of employing a 
                                                     
1 See, for example, the RemoveDEBRIS mission which is testing a number of ADR techniques. 
https://www.airbus.com/space/space-infrastructures/removedebris.html  
2 See Art III of the Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, (adopted 29 March 1972, entered 


































































  3 
a game  me hodolog  o advocate the need to simulate a collision in space resulting from RPOs and the legal 
moot to role-play the subsequent litigation. Such simulations should use open source data and information gained 
from collaborators in the space industry and draw on established rules of conduct for their execution. By war-
gaming  a collision and providing the types of data that will be available to litigators will highlight individual 
satellite operator responsibility before, during and after a collision event. The paper will argue that simulating a 
collision (or collisions) in orbit, the data used will enable space law and policy experts to work with satellite 
operators to fill the void and provide the basis of fault for RPOs. 
 
SPACE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The analysis of the legal position of space operations in Earth orbit must begin with consideration of the extant 
international space law position. This informs domestic legislation and has profound ramifications for orbital 
population, on-orbit servicing, active debris removal (ADR) and indeed any rendezvous and proximity operation 
(RPO) mission. At the heart of the international law framework is the Outer Space Treaty 1967 (OST) and this is 
the primary source of space law that needs addressing3. All of the rules and regulations for governing space 
activity flow from this treaty. The OST provides the basic principles governing the behaviour of humans in space 
but does not have much by the way of granular detail and has no bespoke enforcement mechanisms should states 
violate the terms of the treaty (Lyall and Larsen, 2018). Nonetheless, it is binding as an international treaty and is 
a recognised source of international law, providing the codified framework by which national activities in space 
are regulated (De Man, 2017).  
 
The OST is recognised as the key development in the creation of a set of normative principles underpinning space 
governance and is the cornerstone of the law governing outer space activity. One of the fundamental reasons 
behind its longevity is that it is widely accepted by the international community as providing the basis for the 
le  of he oad  fo  ace ha ing been a ified b  o e  100 na ion 4. Yet, it is very much a creature of its time. 
The OST was negotiated against the backdrop of the Cold War and the OST, places security at its heart, aiming to 
ensure that outer space did not become another theatre of conflict in the Cold War (Blount, 2012, p.516). There 
are key concepts of the OST that were expanded in additional treaties (Agreement on the Rescue and Return of 
Astronauts 1968, The Liability Convention 1972, the Registration Convention 1975 and the Moon Agreement 
1984). It is instructive that, despite a number of significant advancements in technology and a shift in the 
geopolitical climate since their inception, there appears to be little appetite to either withdraw from or 
substantially alter these treaties.  
 
The OST, therefore, establishes the way in which space shall be governed on an international canvas. It grants 
freedoms for certain activities and then regulates them by imposing specific limitations such as activities needing 
to be for the benefit of and in the interests of all countries and holds that the use of space is the province of all 
mankind (Blount, 2019). The OST looks to prohibit the monopolization of space activities by any one nation and 
                                                     
3 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies 1967, 610 UNTS 205, 1968 UKTS 10, Cmnd 3519, 18 UST 2410, TIAS 6347, (1967) 6 ILM 386, (1967) 
61 AJIL 644. It was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 1966 and opened for signature on 
27 January 1967 in London. It entered into force on 10 October 1967. 



































































  4 
ensure that space remains a collaborative venture. The OST recognizes that there are three basic activities; 
exploration, use and scientific investigation. Article I permits the free usage of outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies for all nations, with such exploration to be free from interference by other states. Art II 
of the OST establishes that the Moon and other celestial bodies are res communis omnium, that is, they are things 
of the entire world community and are not capable of being subject to national appropriation or claims of 
sovereignty. In respect of the core activities considered within this discussion, there is little doubt that ADR, on-
orbit se icing and he e of con ella ion  o o ide global in e ne  co e age o ld be con ide ed age  of 
space for the purposes of Art I and is not immediately prohibited by the OST5.  
The innovative and disruptive technologies that will be employed by on-orbit servicing and ADR are not 
explicitly dealt with by extant international space law. Instead, the treaty lays down principles that can be applied 
to the relevant activity. One of the key principles emphasized throughout, is the peaceful nature of space activity 
promoted by the Treaty. Both ADR and on-orbit servicing are ostensibly being developed to enable the 
sustainable development of civilian space, there are undoubted military aspects which make such technology 
d al e . I  i  in e e ing o no e ha  he e i  no e e  ohibi ion on d el e echnolog , al ho gh i  ma  be 
that overtly aggressive militarization of space may fall foul of established international law and therefore be in 
violation of Art III (Blount 2019, pp.180-182).   
 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE ORBITAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
With the first five articles of the Treaty establishing the broad contours of the activity that would be permitted by 
the Treaty, the OST then goes on to provide a troika of articles which outline the contours of state responsibility. 
Art VI endows states with responsibility for authorizing, licensing and on-going supervision of their national 
space activities. Art VII of the OST affirms that liability for damage caused by space objects sits with the 
launching state. The triangle of state responsibility is completed by Art VIII of the OST. This provides that a state 
whose registry is carried on a space object launched into outer space shall retain jurisdiction and control of that 
object and any personnel. Outside of these three, it is also important to consider Art XI, which emphasizes the 
cooperative nature of space activity and provides that states shall conduct their activities in outer space with due 
regard to the corresponding interests. 
 
As the OST is an international treaty it requires both signature (by the state party) and ratification (in the UK 
context this means requiring parliamentary approval via primary legislation). Once ratified, the treaty obligations 
need to be discharged as a State has jurisdiction over any activity from its territory as well as over any activity 
that is carried on by its nationals. In the United Kingdom, the duties under the OST (and especially Art VI, VII 
and VIII) are to be found in the Outer Space Act 1986 and the Space Industry Act 2018. These are pieces of 
primary legislation and establish a regime of regulation to which all entities under the jurisdiction must comply if 
connected with space activity in the UK. The power to licence space activities is currently dealt with by the UK 
Space Agency. 
                                                     
5 The limitations outlined in Art I and II are further delineated by Art III (the incorporation of international law into the corpus of Space 
Law), Art IV (the prohibition of stationing nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on a celestial body) and Art V (the 


































































  5 
 
An oft-criticised aspect of the OST and related treaties is that it does not reflect the new realities of multi-sectored 
space activity (Lyall and Larsen, 2018), as there is no direct mention of private, commercial companies. It is true 
that there is no direct mention of commercialization in the OST, yet the treaty does recognise the role of 
companies and commercial bodies. The usage and exploration sought by private companies, are, therefore subject 
to requisite authorization from a recognised state party and it is up to the state to ensure that the activity is 
compliant with the OST as the state should be called to account if it is not. History shows, however, that despite 
this requirement, states have not been held accountable and the mechanisms by which this could be accomplished 
are not clear. Article VI of the OST affirms that private individuals and organizations are not excluded from 
conducting activities in outer space, providing they are appropriately authorized/licensed, and their activities are 
subject to supervision.  
 
The role of the licensor is, therefore of crucial significance as not only does the grant of a licence authorize space 
activity, it also signals de facto acceptance of liability for space activity under Art VII of the OST. Indeed, in the 
context of current orbital activity, and especially in respect of RPO missions, the most significant legal issue is 
that of liability. It is the Liability Convention (LC) 1972 which builds on the provisions of Art VII of the OST and 
provides that damage caused by space objects to anything on Earth or to an aircraft in flight will attract absolute 
liability (Art II LC 1972). It is Art III LC 1972 which speaks to damage cause by the space object of one state to 
another in orbit. Art III LC 1972 states in full that: 
 
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth to a space object 
of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a space object by a space object 
of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the 
fault of persons for whom it is responsible. 6 
 
This Article envisions liability arising in a series of circumstances where (1) damage is caused elsewhere than on 
the surface of the earth, (2) to a space object of one launching state, (3) by a space object of another launching 
state and (4) liability arises only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible. 
The elements of this provision, especially in relation to fault, will be explored in more detail below.  
 
Having discussed the foundational principles of space law, it can be seen that these twin elements are at the heart 
of the legal quandary that operators and litigators will face. Art VII of the OST and Art III LC 1972 are the most 
commercially significant parts of the international space law as they establish the basic rules for litigation in 
space-related collisions (Trepczynski, 2007). These treaty provisions, however, are silent on the crucial issue as to 
ha  hall con i e fa l  and ho  fa l  ill l ima el  be de e mined. Simila l , he e i  no real discussion as 
to what forum such disputes should be heard and the role of informal dispute resolution mechanisms so crucial to 
modern litigation (Blake, Sime and Browne, 2018). In respect of on-orbit servicing, ADR and (to a lesser extent) 
the use of large constellations of satellites, the extant legal position in respect of liability is limited to a simple re-
statement of the basic position under Art III Liability Convention. Damage caused by the space object of one state 
to the space object of another state will be judged on a fault basis. It is this aspect of the law relating to orbital 
operations that requires discussion in closer detail. 
 
                                                     


































































  6 
ON-ORBIT LIABILITY, FAULT AND NEGLIGENCE 
 
As established above, under Art III LC 1972, liability for the space object collision whilst in orbit is established 
on the basis of fault, whether due to the innate failure of the object itself or failure on the part of the parties 
responsible for the object (Trepczynski, 2007). The application of fault-based liability within the international 
realm is rare, traditionally not found beyond treaty violations or international norms such as genocide (Lyall and 
Larsen, 2018). Contrary to traditional fault-ba ed liabili , ace liabili  conce n  in en  o  negligence o ca e 
damage in respect of someone else acti e in ace  (von der Dunk, 1992). Fault liability itself relies on standards 
of care to judge whether behaviour is reasonable. However, since the UK Outer Space Act 1986 obliges any non-
state spacefaring actor to indemnify the Government against any claims of liability, which were not conducted on 
the s a e  a ho i  and no defini ion e i  o o line ho  fa l  ma  be fo nd i h he Liabili  Con en ion i elf 
(Stamps, 1989). It is, therefore, necessary to apply more traditional, terrestrial approaches to determining fault. 
Doing so will establish the way in which a space liability case would proceed and how reparation via 
compensation will be calculated, although only to the extent of the share of damage caused in a space object 
accident (von der Dunk, 1992). 
 
In establishing fault, whether in orbit or on the Earth, the essence of the claim is the same: that one of the parties 
was in some way responsible for behaviour which was wrong, but which was not criminal. Such behaviour is 
dealt with under the common law tort of negligence7. The modern tort of negligence has its roots in the seminal 
case of Donohue v Stevenson8 and the judgment of Lord Atkin. In that judgment Atkin employed a three-stage 
test which form the basis of all modern claims for negligence. First, is the so-called neighbour principle . In 
relation to space activity, it somewhat crudely could be categorized thus: every state engaged in using the space 
environment owing a duty of care to other space users (von der Dunk, 1992). The second element of tort is that 
there was a breach of that duty by falling below the appropriate standard of care  it is this element that the 
inquiry will focus on. The final element is that damage to the satellite was caused by the breach of duty of the 
operator at fault and that there is a clear causal link between the damage caused and the actions (or failure to act) 
of the operator at fault (Goudkamp and Rogers, 2014). As stated above, whilst there are numerous legal issues 
germane to the liability of a spacecraft in orbit, the fundamental one within the purview of this inquiry are the 
contours of the duty of care and what behaviour should the appropriate standard be judged against.  
  
The Bolam test9 is employed in the legal system of England and Wales as the standard in law by which it is 
established whether fault exists through deviation from the professional common practice of a specialized field. 
Although the facts of the Bolam case itself surrounded medical negligence, the test has since been applied to a 
wide variety of professions. Due to the higher level of knowledge which professionals possess, the standard of 
care incumbent upon them can be reasonably expected to be higher in correlation10.  Consequently, the Bolam test 
i  ha  he e ofe ional  acted in accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible 
b d  f ini n [a e] n  g il  f negligence me el  because there was a body of competent professional 
                                                     
7 A  a e  gene al le el   la  i  c nce ned i h all ca ing e n ibili  f  ce ain e  f l e  fo  f he  de ail  ee 
Peel, E and Goudkamp, J. (2014) Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (19th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell) 
8 [1932] AC 562 
9 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 


































































  7 
opinion which might adopt a different technique 11. In respect of space activity, the assumption could, therefore, 
be made that provided operators of space objects act in an accepted professional manner, even if professional 
opinion does differ, they would not be in breach of their duty of care and consequently would not be liable for any 
damage caused by the collision of space objects.  
Whilst this is good law, there are two fundamental weaknesses when trying to apply the Bolam test to space 
operations. First, is that the test fails to distinguish between what has been done and what ought to have been 
done, making comparison to the relevant standards of care difficult. The true difficulty in establishing fault via the 
Bolam test is that it relies on a peer review system. In contrast to medical negligence, it may be more difficult in 
space operations to find an independent, reasonable third party to establish whether the actions taken did not 
breach the standard of care since space industry peers are competitors may well be mutual victims of damage (von 
der Dunk, 1992). That is not to say that third parties do not exist but, in any event, such litigation may end up 
revolving around a credibility battle between competing experts  a situation that does not lend itself well to 
establishing generalizable rules for fault in space operations.  
The second issue in relation to establishing fault is even more fundamental and takes us into another realm of the 
governance of space, away from space law and into the realm of soft-law, informal mechanisms. The problem can 
be crystalized in the following terms: In establishing what constitutes good practice within any profession 
(beyond the subjective opinion of fellow professionals), guidelines and codes of conduct have provided a reliable 
third-party basis in the past for medical negligence cases. Making decision on this kind of basis, against an 
authoritative third-party guide as to whether liability occurred, removes the problematic element of peer review 
(Samanta and Samanta, 2003). Yet, the granular rules for space objects engaging in rendezvous and manipulation 
in orbit are not explicitly addressed by current space law (either nationally or internationally). Such RPO missions 
do not even, as yet, have informal codes of conduct or recommended elements of best practice. The Consortium 
for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations (known colloquially as CONFERS) is an industry-led 
initiative which promises to promulgate non-binding guidelines based around a broad consensus of operators. 
Their work is, however, still on-going and the industry is, as yet, untested in space. This leaves a significant 
amount of legal ambiguity surrounding the appropriate duties incumbent on both RPO operators and customers 
will mean that establishing fault in litigation will be extremely challenging.  
 
GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICE FOR RPO MISSIONS 
 
Having identified the crucial role that guidelines and codes of conduct will play in establishing the duties upon 
operators in respect of RPOs, this discussion will consider the crucial role that such soft-law agreements have in 
the overall governance of space. Indeed, in contrast to the static nature of international treaty law for outer space, 
the last decade has seen the rise of informal, non-binding codes of conduct as a way of attempting to shape and 
influence normative behaviours of rational space actors. The use of such agreements has a number of advantages 
over more formalistic, binding treaty arrangements (Goh, 2007). An illustration of this can be seen when 
considering efforts to deal with space debris. Whilst no formal, legally binding treaty exists in relation to 
addressing the threat posed by space debris, in 2002 the Inter Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee 
(IADC) promulgated guidance on how to mitigate the rise of debris on future missions. These were presented to 



































































  8 
UNCOPUOS and in 2007, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) promulgated the Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space12.  
 
The strength of these voluntary guidelines is that they reflect the existing practices of national and international 
actors and provide a consensus of the current thinking regarding debris mitigation. There has been widespread 
acceptance of them and, whilst not being a legal duty under the OST, the guidelines are accepted as representing a 
normative, default position in respect of all space missions (Li, 2015). Although not directly applying to RPO 
missions, the agility of non-binding norms to change in-line with technology can be seen in the example of the 
recommended 25-year post mission lifetime guideline for satellites within the UN Debris mitigation guideline. 
Thi  i  b oadl  acce ed no  a  he ind  anda d . Ye  it is now being postulated that, given the increase in 
the orbital population, 25 years is no longer appropriate and should be reduced considerably. It is anticipated that 
within 5 years, the orbital environment will have sufficient number of objects to necessitate a change in the post-
mission disposal criteria with operators simply including this change in their licensing application (Rajapaksa and 
Wijerathna, 2017). This flexibility could prove invaluable as both the technology and procedures involved in RPO 
missions are developed and refined. 
 
Whilst guidelines are a promising mechanism by which to effect meaningful change in normative behaviour 
without the protracted negotiations of an international treaty, there is a note of caution that must be sounded. 
Guidelines and codes of conduct are only successful when they reflect genuine areas of consensus and have 
acceptance on a global level. The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICOCOSA) 
represented an attempt by the European Union in 2014 to produce a non-binding international instrument around 
which efforts to encourage responsible use of space could coalesce into normative behaviour. Whilst there are 
numerous reasons why ICOCOSA has failed to cultivate support, the main objection came from non-EU states 
who felt that the Code was an attempt at the im o i ion of a o -do n  in men  and not the result of 
widespread consultations (Rajagopalan and Porras, 2014).  
 
Moving beyond established guidelines, the space industry does have certain standards of care which have 
developed over the years. As space exploration develops, these standards may evolve in order to stay consistent 
with the technology, but nonetheless, they do represent extant and accepted norms amongst operators (Jakhu et al, 
2017). Before each launch, and where propulsion is part of the mission design, satellites will be equipped with 
enough fuel for the purpose of maneuverability. Satellites with propulsion should be able to propel themselves out 
of the path of fellow space objects or recorded debris, execute end-of-life procedure and retire out of critical 
orbiting space. It is expected that satellites will be monitored throughout their lifetime, and all relevant data will 
be shared, to limit any potential space object collisions. Given the damage which debris causes; the risks will be 
reduced by construction and initial design: through the application of appropriate shielding materials to launched 
satellites (Jakhu et al, 2017).  
 
Nonetheless, there are  as yet - no industry guidelines on the use of constellations, on-orbit servicing and ADR 
(or indeed any RPO mission in space). It could well be that a national regulator will be approving these missions 
and, in doing so, providing the template for future missions of a similar nature. The legal position, therefore, is 
something of a Mobius Loop, with regulators looking to grant licences for experimental missions which become 
the template for future missions and future licences. In essence, the grantor of the licence becomes the arbiter of 
                                                     
12 Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as annexed to UN doc. A/62/20, Report 


































































  9 
good practice for RPO missions, which is as the OST intended. Although outside the remit of this inquiry, there is 
clearly a need for research to be done benchmarking the performance of national regulators to ensure that 
standards are consistently applied by the space actors of each nation. Even if broadly accepted by space operators, 
informal, non-binding guidelines still need to work within the legal framework which currently exists in respect of 
human space activity but more crucially they need to be based on established data and, failing that, adequate 
simulations. 
 
DATA GATHERING AND GUIDELINE FORMATION 
 
So far, this paper has identified the elements of space law which address liability for space collisions. Art III 
LC1972 is clear that liability will arise under the following circumstances; (i) where damage is done by the space 
object of one state, (ii) to the space object of another state, (iii) the state whose object caused the damage will be 
liable if the damage is either (a) the fault of the state or (b) the fault of someone for whom the state is responsible. 
As Hertzfeld and Baseley-Walker (2010) identify, however, collisions in space occur on a spectrum. At one end 
are largely blameless collisions of natural debris impacting upon artificial satellites and at the other end are 
grossly negligent and willful acts where culpability is beyond doubt. The problem facing those states and 
responsible satellite operators is, that the existing liability regime does not define who will be blameworthy for 
collisions in the middle of that spectrum where fault is disputed and both actors can legitimately claim to be 
acting as reasonable space actors.  
 
A ming (and hi  i  a ignifican  b  nece a  lea  of fai h) ha  damage o one a e  ace objec  can be 
ho n o be ca ed b  ano he  a e  ace objec , the fundamental issue will be one of assigning fault. Given the 
discussions and issues outlined above, it would seem that the following questions arise; (1) In the absence of any 
codes of conduct, best practice or industry standards for RPO, what rules should exist to minimize the risks of 
collision and what are the core roles and responsibilities of all space operators in avoiding such outcomes? (2) 
When a collision caused by an RPO cannot be avoided, what evidence is required to properly assign fault and (3) 
What information will be needed by the litigation team in order to successfully either prove or disprove fault.  
 
Whilst it might be possible to construct these rules and answer the questions in abstract, it is argued that a much 
better way to develop the rules is to see events develop by means of a simulation, role-play or even a war game. 
The use of war-gaming methodology to simulate complex and contested events leading to uncertain outcomes is 
well established. Indeed, Paikowsky and Tzezana (2018), have suggested that such an approach can be used to 
simulate the response of nations to a successful space mining operation in the future. As they rightly identify; 
Roleplaying games are also of particular use when trying to forecast the impact and 
consequences of large changes. Experts have an advantage in understanding the results of small 
changes in their field of expertise, but they lose this benefit when confronted with major and 
disruptive changes that span many fields.  (Paikowsky and Tzezana, 2018, p.13) 
There are, however, a considerable number of different variables that need to be tested. There are the actions of 
the space operators both before, during and after an RPO-led collision. There is the collection of data by those on 
the ground, both connected to the operators and those responsible for the acquisition of data regarding the orbital 


































































  10 
what gaps exist in that data and then a requirement to interpret that data for the purposes of litigation. It is 
apparent, therefore that in order to effectively role play a collision and the litigation arising from that, there would 
need to be two simulations; one regarding the event and furnishing the data, another litigating the matter based 
upon the data gathered and analyzed from the first simulation. These role plays will be independent but 
interconnected. For the purposes of identification, they will be conducted under the banner of the Space Law 
Games (SLG). 
 
SLG: CREATING THE TWIN EVENTS   
 
The first element of the SLG will draw upon the experience of the US military in predicting and role-playing 
critical conflicts in space. Having run since 2001, the US Air Force Command Schriever War Games13 have been 
a rich tradition and methodology that can be imported directly into the study. Usually, the scenario for the games 
involves the use of global scenarios which re-create conflict in the space domain. The scenario cuts across 
military and civilian challenges and seeks to use existing capabilities to predict the actions of other actors within 
the space environment (AFSPC, 2017). As Paikowsky and Tzezana (2018) have identified, war-gaming has been 
used for centuries in trying to forecast the way in which complex events might unfold. Given that the template for 
such a simulation exists in the form of the Schriever War Games, it would seem a natural model for the simulation 
of an RPO event which could provide information on the type of data that might be available and the type of data 
that would be missing from a failed RPO mission.  
 
Johnson-Freese (2017) identifies, the key lesson learned from successive Schriever war games is the danger of 
rapid escalation. It will therefore be of peripheral, yet significant benefit that a civilian focused war game may be 
able to project the information given from a non-hostile (i.e. non-wilful) but flawed RPO event and feed into 
military calculations about whether a collision in orbit is hostile or not. Yet the data that could be gleaned from 
the simulation poses a crucial question about the location of the simulation. The nature of the RPO mission is 
likely be contingent upon the altitude of the spacecraft that are docking with each other. As Blount (2019) 
identifies, RPO missions in LEO are likely to be centred around the removal of debris from congested orbits, 
while GEO missions are likely to focus on extending the life of expensive space assets. These two missions, 
whilst falling under the umbrella of RPOs are very different in both execution and outcome. In all likelihood, to 
gain sufficient richness of data, it will be necessary to conduct two separate, independent simulations of RPO 
missions, an ADR mission in LEO and on-orbit servicing simulation in GEO.  
 
Identifying the war-gaming methodology for the first im la ion, and he need fo  o di inc  game  in 
different orbits is crucial as these will provide the data for the legal phase of SLG. Just as war-gaming is a well-
established method of gathering data about decision-making in theatres of armed conflict, so law has its own 
tradition of role-playing. The legal moot is used extensively within law training; therefore, this seems a natural 
way to simulate the litigation needed for the second half of the SLG. The Moot is a role play which involves the 
posing of certain legal questions that need addressing. The role-play itself, however, is open-ended and such a 
simulation may produce conclusions which will surprise both the student and the adjudicator (Phillips, 2012). 
Given the total absence of litigation in this respect, the moot seems an ideal way in which to test the contours of 
fault within a courtroom setting using the data produced by the space war game14. The rules for both the creation 
                                                     
13 See https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1349906/schriever-wargame-concludes/ for further details. 
14 The Space Law Games represents a new, hybrid approach to simulating possible outcomes. There is, however, a long history 


































































  11 
of the skeleton argument and the subsequent oral presentation are well defined and clearly understood by lawyers 
(Baskind, 2016).  
 
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE SLG 
 
This paper has outlined the legal vacuum that exists in respect of defining fault in space collisions. The discussion 
has identified that for all RPO missions, the lack of accepted operator practice means that in many circumstances 
it could be extremely difficult to establish fault. Whilst clear negligence or malpractice may be easy to identify, in 
the early years of on-orbit servicing, ADR and the operation of a very large constellation, the experimental nature 
of the ventures will make it extremely high risk and consequently difficult to establish clear identifiable 
operational duties which have been breached. There will undoubtedly be guidance issued for operators, through 
forums such as CONFERS and this may form the basis of establishing duties and roles but until such time as RPO 
missions become ubiquitous, the legal uncertainty surrounding the appropriate duties incumbent on both RPO 
operators and customers will mean that establishing fault in litigation will be extremely challenging.  
 
The proposed SLG will attempt to ameliorate some of that uncertainty by combining two recognised forms of 
open-ended simulations designed to be led by the data that emerges. It is hoped this will complement the 
discussions underway within the space industry and appropriate government agencies in respect of identifying 
best practice.  Each phase of the SLG will yield valuable data and go some way towards answering the key 
e ion  o ed b  hi  a e . The fi  on-o bi  ha e ill highligh  he da a ha  co ld and ho ld be a ailable 
to both operators and observers, possibly highlighting the gaps and illustrating what additional tracking capacity 
is needed that is not already available. The legal moot phase will take that data and identify the duties owed at 
each stage of satellite operations. This will highlight the kinds of evidence that will be admitted, the scrutiny and 
weight that can be placed on that evidence. It will also be used to draw together the contours of liability to give 
operators some indication of how a collision in LEO or GEO will proceed should the case go to court. The SLG 
represent an ambitious attempt to use a variety of simulations and methodologies to close one of the biggest gaps 
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